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A. DESCRIPTION OF NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDS
Military base commanders obtain funds to conduct their
activities from two sources: Appropriated Funds and Non-
appropriated Funds.
Appropriated Funds are provided by the Congress. They
consist primarily of Operations and Maintenance (0§M) funds
which are intended for support of mission essential activities
such as training. A small portion of Appropriated Funds is
designated for support of the various morale- and retention-
enhancing services which exist at every base, but the amounts
are insufficient to support the level of these services which
is customarily provided.
Non-appropriated Funds are broken down into two further
categories: Central Welfare Funds and Base Welfare Funds.
Central Welfare Funds are obtained from the profits of
the military exchange systems. These funds are distributed
to base commanders to support gymnasiums, hobby shops, swim-
ming pools, and other welfare and recreational activities
which are routinely used by all personnel.
Base Welfare Funds are generated by the activities of
clubs organized to serve various special interest groups.
These organizations include officer and enlisted clubs, audio
clubs, photography clubs, rod and gun clubs, flying clubs,
etc., and are generally referred to as Non-appropriated Funds.
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Although no definitive figures exist, a recent (1973) survey
indicated that there were some 17,000 Non-appropriated Funds
operating throughout the Department of Defense, generating
about $7 billion in sales [Ref. 1] . While it should come as
no great surprise to anyone familiar with officer and enlisted
clubs that these activities could generate a considerable
dollar volume, estimates of $5.6 million in sales by fifty-
five rod and gun clubs, and $43 million in sales by thirty
audio clubs [Ref. 2] may prove somewhat astonishing. It
becomes clear why the exchanges periodically voice complaints
about sales lost to Non-appropriated Funds. It also becomes
clear why the (fortunately infrequent) revelations of embezzle-
ment and other irregularities in Non-appropriated Funds arouse
so much concern in Congress and DOD about alleged lack of
supervision and control of these activities, and the sub-
stantial monies they generate.
Almost all Non-appropriated Funds are directed by a board
of governors or some similar body which is usually elected by
the membership. In addition, a custodian, who must be a member
on active duty, is appointed as a non- voting member of the
board by the base commander. The custodian is accountable
for the physical assets of the Fund, and is tasked with keeping
the base commander (who bears the ultimate responsibility for
proper operation of the Fund) informed of the progress of the
organization. A full-time manager, as well as other employees,




The financial and other problems which seem endemic among
Non-appropriated Funds stem directly from two characteristics
which are universal and interactive.
The first characteristic is non-professional management.
More often than not, election to the board of governors is
dependent upon time available to serve and popularity among
the membership, rather than managerial expertise. Even if
the membership is astute enough to elect a capable board, the
turnover imposed by normal transfers ensures that long-term
planning and follow-up will be difficult to accomplish.
The second characteristic is that goods and services are
provided at prices which are lower than those available
elsewhere. The reduced prices arise from several factors.
Non-appropriated Funds are operated on a not-for-profit basis.
The use of surplus government equipment and rent-free govern-
ment facilities minimize capital requirements and overhead.
The practice of employing military retirees or "moonlighting"
active duty personnel at relatively low pay scales contributes
to reduced costs for labor and day-to-day management. Unfor-
tunately, at the low wage rates required to keep costs down,
it is difficult to attract employees with sufficient training
or ability to offset the managerial shortcomings of the typical
board. Thus Non-appropriated Funds,' by their very nature, are
vulnerable to severe management difficulties.
B. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Systems analysis is an approach to, or a way of looking
at, complex problems of choice, usually under conditions
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of uncertainty. It offers a framework for inquiry which is
designed to aid decisionmakers in selecting preferred future
courses of action . The framework is built upon systematic
search for relevant objectives and alternate means of achiev-
ing them, and quantitative comparison of the costs, benefits,
and risks involved in the identified alternatives [Ref . 3]
.
Systems analysis usually involves the following phases:
Formulation - Entailing specification of the boundaries
and issues of a problem, as well as the criteria for choice.
Search - Involving the accumulation of data and the devel-
opment of hypotheses concerning relationships which bear
on the problem under investigation.
Evaluation - Encompassing the construction of models
(usually quantitative) which identify the consequences of
alternatives and allow comparison based on the consequences.
Inte rpretation - Collating the alternatives generated in
the evaluation phase with any other relevant information
in order to extract conclusions and fix courses of action.
Verification - Testing the conclusions, if testing is
possible
.
Of these phases, the first is the most important. Obviously
the right answer to the wrong problem is of little value. In
fact, the criticality of the formulation stage often leads to
an iterative process of investigation. Evaluation and inter-
pretation of data and relationships developed in the search
phase may expose errors in definition which require re-
formulation and repetition of the entire process.
With regard to models, it is important to bear in mind
that their main purpose is to develop meaningful relationships
between the costs and benefits of various objectives and
alternatives. They need not be highly mathematical or
13

computerized, but they should emphasize factors which are
most relevant to the problem under consideration, while
moderating items of lesser import. Lastly, since models are
by definition only a representation of the true state of the
world, they must include both provision for dealing with
uncertainty and explicit delineation of the assumptions on
which they rest [Ref . 3]
.
Systems analysis is an art founded upon the discipline
and logic of mathematics and the scientific method. Conceived
in the murky complexities of long-term military planning, it
has emerged from the "puzzle palaces" of the Department of
Defense to become an important tool for planners in industry
and many other endeavors. The fact that it was developed to
cope with huge problems over future decades should not pre-
clude the effective employment of its fundamental concepts
in planning for a fortnight. Of course, the principle holds
that, while in the long run nothing is fixed, in the short
run everything may be. Thus the number of feasible altern-
atives is likely to be inversely proportional to the planning
horizon. For organizations which historically have found it
difficult to employ the most rudimentary forms of planning,
the elements of systems analysis should prove eminently useful
even though planning horizons may be short and choices limited
C . OBJECTIVE
As discussed in the preceding section, systems analysis
has evolved as a valuable method for assisting decisionmakers
in dealing with highly complex problems of immense magnitude.
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It seems reasonable that the systems analysis approach to
problem solving should prove equally useful regardless of
the scope of the activity or project to be analyzed. The
objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the utility of
systems analysis when applied to the more mundane problems
of organizations which comprise a relatively small, but none-




Research for this paper involved an investigation of
library resources, both published and unpublished, pertaining
to Non-appropriated Funds. Several standard texts on systems
analysis and operations research provided material for the
introductory and applications sections. The operational and
financial data of the Non-appropriated Fund used as an example
were extracted from historical records of the organization and
interviews with knowledgeable members.
E. METHODOLOGY
Following a brief description and history of the Non-
appropriated Fund used as an example, selected major problems
of the organization are identified. Each problem is then





II. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPLIED
A. 3ACKGR0UND
The Fort Ord Flying Club is a Non-appropriated Fund which
provides opportunities for recreational flying and advanced
flight training to active duty and retired military personnel,
and federal employees in the vicinity of Fort Ord, California.
The following historical information was provided by a long-
standing member [Ref . 4]
.
The Fort Ord Flying Club was organized by about 30 members
in 1956 or 1957. It began operations with one surplus Army
observation aircraft (a two-passenger Piper J-3 Cub variant),
two surplus Ryan Navions (four-passenger, single-engine,
retractable gear) and a Cessna 172 (four-passenger, single-
engine, fixed gear). The club aircraft were based at Monarch
Aviation, Inc., a fixed base operator located on the Monterey
Peninsula Airport. Operation from the civilian facility was
forced by the unwillingness of the commander of Fritzsche Army
Airfield, which is located adjacent to the Fort Ord complex,
to grant permission for the club to operate from his facility.
The non- flying activities of the club were conducted in
facilities made available on the main post.
By 1966, the club had grown to about 45 members. It had
two two-place Cessna 150 trainers and a Cessna 172. At about
this time the club was invited by a more sympathetic airfield
commander to move its entire operation to Fritzsche Field.
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Among several advantages proffered to induce the club to move,
the most significant were the promise of office space and
meeting facilities in the airfield hangars, and access to
aviation fuel at military contract prices.
The club elected to move to Fritzsche. One of the con-
sequences of the change in location was that the maintenance
services of Monarch Aviation were no longer convenient.
Arrangements were made for necessary maintenance to be per-
formed on a part-time basis by appropriately licensed Army
aircraft mechanics.
Not long after the move to Fritzsche, the club hired its
first full-time manager/flight instructor. The new manager
undertook an ambitious expansion program. Under his guidance,
the club acquired several surplus aircraft, and part of the
old fleet was retired. He established a flight training pro-
gram approved under Part 141 of the Federal Aviation Regulations,
which permitted advanced training beyond the Private Pilot level
under the G.I. Bill. He encountered problems in dealing with
the military mechanics which he solved by hiring a full-time
civilian. Frustrated by continual shuffling of the club's
location by the Army, he arranged for the club to install a
large mobile home on the airfield and converted the interior
into office space and classrooms. An aggressive drive increased
the active membership to a peak of 147 in May of 1973. By the
Fall of 1973, however, he had become disenchanted with the
vagaries of dealing with the Army bureaucracy, and in November





A new manager was hired in December 1973. Flight activity
increased significantly, but little attention was devoted to
administration, and this important aspect of club operation
began to fall into disarray. Personality conflicts led to
the dismissal of the full-time mechanic. Part-time Army men
were employed once again, and a significant portion of the
major engine repairs were sent to Monarch Aviation. Personal
problems caused the second manager to resign in June of 1974.
Following the departure of the second manager, the day-
to-day operations of the club were directed by a series of
part-time member/managers. By October 1974, financial liquidity
problems, which had begun under the second manager, became
severe. The general condition of the club aircraft was poor
and worsening, and the membership began to complain about poor
aircraft availability. Alarmed by the deteriorating situation,
the Board of Governors initiated a reorganization effort in
early December. They elected a new president who possessed
considerable general aviation management experience.
The reorganization effort was spurred by events. On 14
December, the club was closed due to unsatisfactory conditions
revealed in the course of a routine administrative inspection.
At the same time, the club was notified that the hangar spaces
occupied by the club for parts storage and aircraft maintenance
would have to be vacated immediately. The move was required
by the relocation of various units in preparation for the
influx of an additional Division at Fort Ord. The club was
advised that space would be provided in another hangar located
18

at a considerable distance from the club trailer for indoor
disassembly and repair of one aircraft at a time. Inventories
of parts, tools, and materials were to be placed in two 12'
x 8' x 6 ? bulk shipping containers adjacent to the newly
assigned hangar.
Incredibly, the unsatisfactory conditions noted by the
administrative inspectors had little to do with the major
problems facing the club. Much attention was given to the
lack of custody receipts for office furniture, and to the fact
that the club Constitution and By-Laws were not in agreement
with the latest changes to Army Regulations. The pressing
demands of creditors, the marginal condition of club aircraft,
and recent severe financial losses were only indirectly
addressed. Nevertheless, it was clear that the continued
viability of the club was in jeopardy.
A brief digression from the narrative is appropriate at
this point. The above comments concerning the results of the
administrative inspection highlight one of the major diffi-
culties which routinely hinders the effective functioning of
the club. There is a severe lack of understanding in the
middle management echelons, both civilian and military, of
the nature of flying club operations. To a large extent,
this lack of understanding is due to unfamiliarity with civil
aviation, but it nevertheless severely hampers the optimum
functioning of the club.
As an example of the result of this lack of understanding,
extensive and time-consuming administrative procedures are
19

required in order for the club to incur financial obligations
greater than $500. Yet expenditures in excess of this amount
are routinely required to maintain the aircraft. And the
competitive bid procedures required for aircraft purchases
are so time consuming as to effectively prevent the club from
taking advantage of unique and attractive opportunities which
normally exist for very brief periods, and which, if realized,
would enable the club to provide its services at much reduced
cost to its members.
Several steps were taken immediately upon closure of the
club. The administrative discrepancies were corrected, which
allowed the resumption of operations. Aircraft rental rates
were compared with estimated operating costs and adjusted to
profitable levels (see Appendix A for current cost estimates)
.
Finally, an aggressive program to collect long overdue receiv-
ables and the sale of an aircraft engine provided funds to
satisfy creditor demands.
A number of problems remained unresolved, however. First
and foremost, several club aircraft were in need of replace-
ment, but it was not clear how many newer aircraft should be
procured. Second, serious doubt existed about the efficacy
of current maintenance practices. Finally, planned increases
in military operations at Fritzsche Army Airfield raised




B. THE AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT PROBLEM
1 . Formulation
Table I presents the aircraft currently possessed by
the club and a summary of their condition. The issue at hand
is whether certain of the aircraft should be replaced by newer
models, or, alternatively, repaired to a more satisfactory
condition. But before this problem can be attacked, the
systems analysis approach requires that the decision criteria
be specified.
Clearly, the decision criteria will depend on. the
objectives of the organization. In the case of the Fort Ord
Flying Club in December 1974, the objectives may be defined
as
:
1. To provide flight training and recreational flying
opportunities for eligible members at minimum cost.
2. To recover from the existing financial crisis as rapidly
as is feasible in order to ensure continued ability to
achieve the primary objective.
The first objective requires clarification. It implies
that some fixed level of effectiveness is desired at minimum
cost, as opposed to maximizing effectiveness subject to a
specific level of expenditure. This distinction of the con-
ceptual framework within which a problem will be approached
is fundamental to the systems analysis methodology, and depends
on the context of the problem [Ref. 5). In this case, the
fixed level of effectiveness to be achieved is determined by
the demand for flight time by current and prospective members
of the club. But there is a qualitative issue involved in
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in an absolute sense through the use of old, marginally
equipped aircraft. Alternatively, newer, better equipped
aircraft may be provided, with commensurate increases in cost
to the membership. Thus, the level of effectiveness used to
determine decision criteria must be defined in terms of both
the quality and quantity of flight services demanded.
Obviously, the second objective listed above suggests
a further restriction on the minimization of costs. In the
long run, costs to the membership will be minimized if the
club is operated on a break-even basis. Recovery of past
financial losses, however, requires operation above break-even
for some period, and the rate of recovery will be a function
of both future profitability and future activity levels.
It should be clear from the above discussion that the
problem at hand goes beyond a simple "replace or repair"
decision. Succinctly stated, the problem is:
What is the optimum mix and quality of aircraft which
should be operated by the Fort Ord Flying Club in order
to satisfy the flying demands of its members at minimum
cost while recovering from previous financial losses?
2 . Search
The second phase of the systems analysis approach to
problem solving involves searching for relevant data and
developing hypotheses about the problem. For the Flying Club
example, an investigation into past flight activity should
prove a fertile place to begin.
a. Flight Activity Analysis
Documents used in the preparation of members'
monthly statements provided the flight activity data which
24

is presented in Appendix B. This data is summarized in
Table II.
The Table II figures show that for the 22-month
period from February 1973 to November 1974, approximately
761 of the club's flying was done in the Cessna 150 trainers.
The club-owned 150' s averaged 67.8 revenue hours per month
for the months they flew. The more complex aircraft, however,
averaged only 19.4 revenue hours per revenue month.
The column headed "Revenue hours as a percent of
potential flying hours" is an attempt to obtain a measure of
aircraft utilization. At 23% for all Cessna 150 's and 6% for
all complex aircraft, the utilization appears to be very poor.
But, as is explained in footnote 2, the potential flying
hours used to arrive at those percentages are based on eight
hours per day (0900 - 1700) and thirty days per month. No
allowance was made for weather interference with flight
activity
.
Weather is an important factor, obviously. Only
a very small percentage of club members are qualified to fly
in instrument conditions (less than 1,000 foot ceiling and/or
less than three miles' visibility). Furthermore, if weather
conditions are less than 3,000 foot ceiling and/or three
miles' visibility, primary flight training is somewhat re-
stricted, and few pilots would have much interest in recrea-
tional flying.
Historical weather data (see Appendix C) for
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Fritzsche has weather better than l,000'/2 miles 63% of the
time, and better than 3,000 '/3 miles 33% of the time between
0900 and 1700 [Ref . 5]
.
Table III shows potential flying hours and air-
craft utilization adjusted for weather interference. Not
surprisingly, aircraft utilization percentages improve dramat-
ically as weather criteria increase, and the wide differential
between Cessna 150 and complex aircraft utilization continues
to hold. This differential arises primarily from two causes.
First, the complex aircraft, by virtue of their
heavier weight, greater horsepower and more complicated
powerplants, and in some cases, retractable landing gear, are
more difficult to fly than the Cessna 150 trainers. They are
also more costly to operate and maintain. Therefore, the
training conducted in the complex aircraft is limited to the
transition check-outs and instrument work associated with
advanced ratings, and funded by veteran's benefits. This
type of advanced training typically requires flights of long
duration (often to distant airports) , and therefore tends to
be concentrated on weekends. Almost no privately funded
recreational or personal transport flying is done in these
aircraft during the week (Monday - Friday) . Thus, these air-
craft tend to sit relatively idle during the normal work week,
only to be intensively utilized on the weekends.
Second, due to their complexity, the complex
aircraft are more difficult to maintain. When mechanical
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repair than the training aircraft. This fact, coupled v/ith
intermittent demand by a minority of the membership, leads
to "last priority" maintenance in an organization where funds
and maintenance personnel are scarce. In Table II, the dif-
ference between "revenue months" and "potential flying months"
reflects periods when the aircraft didn't fly, presumably
because they were not flyable. The problem of aircraft
maintenance and availability will be addressed in detail
later. It will suffice at this point to note that utilization
of all club aircraft is affected by availability problems,
and the complex aircraft suffer more from this malady than
do the Cessna 150 trainers.
With the preceding discussion in mind, examination
of Table II and Table III reveals that the club aircraft are
under-utilized. Using l,000'/2 miles as an approximation of
the minimum weather conditions acceptable for visual operations
(and also because the data happens to be available) , the Cessna
150' s have flown 37% of the potential flight hours during the
past two years, and the complex aircraft are worse at only 9%
on the average. Two of the complex aircraft, N3618R and
N6232P, show significantly higher utilization than the others
in that category, at 21% and 25%, respectively, of the poten-
tial flight hours in l,000'/2 miles or better weather. These
figures are of interest because the two aircraft are the most
costly in the fleet, renting for $22 and $25 per hour. The
higher utilization of N6232P is due in part to recent changes
in Federal Aviation Regulations which require more training
30

for advanced flight students in complex, high-performance,
retractable-gear aircraft. Both aircraft are newer, better
equipped, and nicer looking than the other planes in the
fleet. But there is little difference in performance between
N3618R and one of the Army surplus aircraft, N17282 for
example, which is old, somewhat noisy, not very pretty to
look at, and rents for $15.50 per hour. The higher utiliza-
tion of N6232P and N3618R, novelty considerations aside (these
planes have been available for less than two months), seem to
indicate a willingness on the part of the members to pay
higher rates for better quality equipment. In other v/ords,
utilization may not be terribly sensitive to price, so long
as rental rates remain noticeably lower than commercial
charges
.
Non-revenue operations occur as a result of main-
tenance ground checks and test flights, and administrative
flights for parts pick-up, recovery of stranded aircraft, etc.
This data was included in Table II primarily to discover
whether non-revenue activities constituted a constraint on
aircraft availability for revenue operations. It is clear
that they do not. From a management standpoint, however,
the tendency to use the more expensive aircraft for admin-
istrative purposes should be recognized as a costly luxury.
Administrative flight costs obviously should be minimized
by conducting such flights in conjunction with revenue
producing training flights, or by employing the least expen-
sive aircraft which will meet the need. Certainly, the
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devotion of 201 of the total flight time of the Apache Twin,
N1063P, to administrative flights was excessive, and steps
should be taken to preclude such extravagance in the future.
In addition to aircraft rental, an important
service demanded by the membership is flight instruction.
The availability of flight instructors :s critical to the
successful operation of the club, since the vast majority
of its members join for the specific purposes of learning
to fly or improving flying skills. Instructional flights
are scheduled on the basis of mutual convenience for both
student and instructor, subject, of course, to aircraft
availability.
Table IV presents data relating aircraft flight
time to Certified Flight Instructor activity for the last
six months of 1974. During this period, the club employed
one full-time instructor who also performed certain manage-
ment functions. The full-time instructor was supplemented
by as many as six members who possessed CFI ratings and who
instructed on a part-time basis. Table IV shows that approx-
imately 80% of the Cessna 150 flight time during the period
required the services of a flight instructor. Slightly more
than 62% of the complex aircraft time required an instructor,
and this figure jumps to almost 85% for the complex aircraft
used for advanced training and instrument work. It is clear
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Another significant constraint on club flight
activity is the availability of aircraft fuel. The club is
authorized 600 gallons of 115/145 octane aviation gasoline
from the Army at the military contract price. This fuel is
used in the complex aircraft. The Cessna 150' s require 80/87
octane fuel which is obtained from commercial suppliers.
During the so-called "energy crunch" of 1974, the club
exceeded its allotment of 80/87 fuel several months consecu-
tively. It has applied to the appropriate authorities for
an increase in its allotment of 80/87 to an average of
approximately 1820 gallons per month, although no restrictions
are currently enforced by the commercial supplier. Further-
more, the Army has been requested to increase the military
contract allotment to 2000 gallons per month.
A final aspect of club flight activity which is
of some interest is presented in Table V which shows that for
a recent 22-month period the flight activity of the club
membership has fluctuated fairly closely around an average
value of 2.6 hours per month per member.
b. Financial Analysis
Since the problem at hand is concerned with the
financial condition of the club, an examination of its finan-
cial history should prove of interest. Quarterly Profit and
Loss, Balance Sheets, and Sources and Uses of Funds statements
for 1973 and 1974 are provided in Appendix D.
Examination of the financial data reveals that
approximately three- fourths of the club's revenues are pro-




Flight Activity Per Member










Feb 419.1 144 2.9
Mar 311.8 14 2.2
Apr 369.6 145 2.5
May 251.1 147 1.7
Jun 431.5 140 3.1
Jul 310.5 141 2.2
Aug 314.1 134 2.3
Sep 295.8 125 2.4
Oct 299.7 123 2.4
Nov 283.7 122 2.3
Dec 288.5 117 2.5
1974
Jan 321.0 120 2.7
Feb 372.9 127 2.9
Mar 383.6 133 2.9
Apr 403.2 127 3.2
May 427.9 137 3.1
Jun 423.8 139 3.0
Jul 298.6 138 2.2
Aug 305.9 132 2.3
Sep 275.8 121 2.3
Oct 308.1 119 2.6




income is derived from membership dues and initiation fees,
with the remainder provided by ground school instruction and
miscellaneous activities.
Members are billed at the end of the month, with
accounts due by the end of the following month. Members
pursuing training programs which are subsidized by veterans'
benefits (referred to as VA students) have traditionally been
allowed considerable payment latitude in view of the extensive
delays encountered in receiving reimbursement checks from the
Veterans' Administration. The fact that VA students are
required to fly a minimum of ten hours per month (many fly
considerably more) , coupled with the customary practice of
carrying their accounts until reimbursement checks arrive,
causes a major portion of club accounts receivable to be
generated by a minority of the membership.
The expenses of the club arise from two broad
categories of activity: aircraft operations and club admin-
istration. Aircraft operation and maintenance expenditures
absorb more than three- fourths of the club's revenues, and
at times have exceeded income (Appendix D) . General and
administrative expenses consume about one-fifth of total
income, or roughly the portion of income generated by dues
and initiation fees.
The major component of general and administrative
expense, management compensation, camouflages an important
aspect of club operations. Historically, the Contract Man-
ager has been required to perform (or employ clerical help
36

at his own expense) the burdensome functions associated with
VA record-keeping and pilot certification, as well as the
routine administrative duties involved in a normal Non-appr-
priated Fund. These additional functions are required by
federal and state regulations governing aviation and veterans'
training. Compliance with these regulations results in
significant costs which are unique in comparison with other
Non-appropriated Funds.
Table VI presents a summary of the important
profit and loss figures in common-size format, and relates
the expenses of flight operations to flight activity data
from Appendix B. Table VI also shows several standard
financial liquidity ratios on a quarterly basis and a sched-
ule of historical aircraft rental charges.
The data in Table VI suggests that the financial
problems of the club stem from two causes: failure to adjust
aircraft rental rates to compensate for rapidly increasing
operating expenses, and failure to maintain adequate fin-
ancial liquidity.
It is clear from Table VI that aircraft operating
expenses have risen rapidly during 1973-1974, while general
and administrative expenses have fluctuated around a fairly
constant level. Maintenance expense, a major component of
operational expense, showed a slight declining trend during
1973, but rapid rises in 1974 may reflect both the increas-
ing age of the aircraft and the delayed impact of previous
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operational and maintenance expense relative to income in
the last quarter of 1974 is probably misleading. Flight
activity and aircraft maintenance ceased entirely for over
half of December. It seems likely that had normal operations
been continued throughout the last quarter, expenses would
have reflected established trends.
Unfortunately, the accounting practices of the
club make an analysis of operational and maintenance expendi-
tures by aircraft type infeasible. But a comparison of the
Table VI data on total operational expense per flight hour
with rental rate adjustments of the Cessna ISO's (which
contribute nearly 80% of the flight hours) seems to indicate
that rental rate adjustments have lagged behind cost increases
A firm's current ratio (current assets -f- current
liabilities) is a commonly used measure of its ability to
meet current financial obligations. The ratio of cash on
hand to current liabilities also reflects ability to meet
the immediate demands of creditors. The ratios of accounts
payable and accounts receivable to average day's sales indi-
cate the payment and collection practices of the firm. The
Table VI figures show disastrous declines in liquidity for
the club during 1973 and the first three quarters of 1974.
At the end of September 1974, the club could have paid a
paltry 15% of its debts out of cash on hand, and only 931
of the outstanding obligations could have been satisfied
if all accounts receivable had been collected. The analysis
of payables and receivables in Table VI shows that the club
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operated on a cash basis with its creditors in 1973. But in
1974, it became increasingly dependent on trade credit to
finance its operations. The receivables collection practices
of the club deteriorated in a similar fashion. By the end of
the third quarter of 1974, it was over two months behind,
based on average day's sales, in collecting receivables.
Clearly, the burden of carrying members' accounts until checks
arrived from the Veterans' Administration had become intoler-
able.
Based on the above analysis, the moves by the
Board of Governors in December 1974 to adjust aircraft rental
rates, to collect outstanding receivables, and to pay off
creditors were certainly appropriate, if not exactly timely.
Their efforts are reflected in the sharp fourth quarter
turnaround of the liquidity and receivables/payables ratios.
But more will have to be done along these lines before any
lending institutions can be approached to secure funds for
replacement aircraft.
One final aspect of club financial operations
deserves comment. No formal budgets are prepared by the
management. Flight activity forecasting and financial plan-
ning have traditionally been of the "hip pocket" variety.
There is, hoivever, a loose policy to the effect that the
general and administrative expenses of the club should be
covered by monthly membership dues (as they historically
have been, for the most part) , and that aircraft rental





Based on the data available, the following
hypotheses appear reasonable:
1. Club flight activity for any period can be predicted
on the basis of membership during the period.
2. Aircraft operating profits are determined by variable
profits from aircraft operations less aircraft ownership
and maintenance fixed costs.
3. Total variable profit from aircraft operations is
determined by flight activity, which in turn depends on
weather, fuel and instructor availability, aircraft
availability, and demand for flying by the membership.
4. Club revenues in any given period result from aircraft
rental, ground school fees, and membership dues. Total
revenues minus aircraft operating expenses and adminis-
trative expenses gives net profit for the period.
3 . Evaluation
In the evaluation phase, the systems analyst is
concerned with developing models which relate the variables
relevant to his problem.
The first hypothesis of the preceding section postu-
lates that club membership can be used to predict flight
activity. The data in Table V suggest that some relationship
exists between dues-paying members and flight activity, since
monthly per-member flying fluctuates around an average of
2.6 hours. However, not all dues -paying members fly. And
furthermore, among the dues-paying members who fly actively,
persons enrolled in VA training programs can be expected, to
fly more hours in any given period than the average flying
member, since VA students are required to fly a minimum of
ten hours per month.
Linear regression using the method of least squares
is a commonly used technique for analyzing the relationship
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between variables, and then making predictions based on the
result. References [6] and [7] contain detailed explanations
of regression analysis.
To test the utilization of membership as a predictor
of flight activity, a stepwise linear regression analysis
was performed. The independent variables used (and their
sources) were:
1. Total dues-paying members (Table IV)
2. Total VA members (Appendix E)
3. Actively flying members (Appendix E)
4. Proportion of VA to total members (transgeneration)
5. Proportion of VA to actively flying members
(transgeneration)
The dependent variable was the monthly flight hour data
listed in Table V. Tables VII and VIII show the results of
the regression analysis.
The matrix of correlation coefficients in Table VII
reveals that there is no strong relationship between any of
the independent variables and flight activity. The data in
Table VIII shows that none of the combinations of variables
listed will provide very meaningful predictions of flight
activity.
The second hypothesis postulated that aircraft oper-
ating profits are determined by variable profits from aircraft
rental less the fixed costs of owning and maintaining the
aircraft. For any aircraft inventory and any period, this
relationship can be represented:
eq (1) PA = Z - F




Correlation Matrix for Flight
Activity Variables12 3 4 5 6







1.000 .388 .206 .352 .291 .249
.000 -.280 .713 .967 .876
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Z = contribution (variable profit) from
aircraft rental operations during the
period
F = total fixed costs associated with
aircraft ownership during the period.
Given the goal of improving the financial condition
of the club, it seems reasonable to approach the aircraft
rental operation from a revenue maximization viewpoint.
The third hypothesis suggests that the elements of
club activity and operating environment which determine total
variable profit from aircraft operations can be structured as
a system of linear relationships. If the hours flown by
individual aircraft are specified as the decision variables,
it is possible to arrange these relationships into a linear
programming problem [see Reference 8 for an explanation of
linear programming] which has as its objective the maximization
of variable profit from aircraft rentals.
It should be emphasized that the hours flown by any
particular aircraft in any period are not wholly controllable
by the club management. The design of flight training cur-
ricula can affect aircraft utilization to some degree, but
actual utilization is determined primarily by the demand of
the membership for recreational as well as training flights.
Therefore, the linear programming model which folloivs should
be understood as a means of interpreting the relationships
of the factors which bear on club flight activity, and not
as a standard for the evaluation of management performance.
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The third hypothesis suggests that total variable
profit from aircraft operations can be represented by the
following relationships:
n
eq (2) Z = r c i x,i = l ± x
where Z = contribution from aircraft rental
operations during the period
n = the number of aircraft in use during
the period
i = each specific aircraft used during
the period, i = 1, 2, 3, ...n
Cj[= variable profit of aircraft i per
flight hour
Xi= revenue hours flown by aircraft i
during the period.
eq (3) Xi < w f T
where xj = revenue hours flown by aircraft i
during the period
w = a weather factor determined by the
percentage of available flying hours
during which suitable flying condi-
tions prevail
f = a turnaround factor which estimates
time lost in aircraft refueling, etc
T = total hours available for flying
without considering weather and turn-
around factors.
eq (4) £ Ji x i < Qp
i
where n = number of aircraft in use during the
period
i = each specific aircraft in use during
the period
jj= fuel consumption of aircraft i in
gallons per hour
X-: = revenue hours flown by aircraft i
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Qp.= available quantity of fuel required
by aircraft i.
ec
l ( 5 ) .E, d Xi < Ii=l
where n = number of aircraft in use during the
period
d = the percentage of flight hours requir-
ing a flight instructor
i = each aircraft used during the period
x^= revenue hours flown by aircraft i
during the period
I = total instructor hours available.
Using the preceding relationships, the techniques of
linear programming can be employed to determine the maximum
variable profit obtainable from any chosen mix of aircraft,
subject to the constraints imposed by weather, fuel limita-
tions, and instructor availability. Aircraft flight hours
will be used as the decision variables, even though it is
recognized that they are not entirely controllable by
management
.
If it is assumed that:
1. The club has the use of three Cessna 150' s, two O-lA's,
one Cherokee 180, one T-41, and one Commanche 250,
2. The variable profit figures in Appendix A are valid,
3. Aircraft are available for flights between 0900-1700,
and therefore T = 240 hours per month,
4. The minimum weather conditions for flight are 1,000'/
2 miles, and therefore w = .63 for Fritzsche Airfield
(Appendix C)
,
5. Twenty percent of available flight time is absorbed




6. Total flight instructor hours available are as follows:
1 Chief pilot/manager @ 3 hrs/day, 7 days/week =
84 hrs/month
5 Part-time instructors @ 5 hrs each, Monday-Friday
and 3 hrs each Saturday £• Sunday = 220 hrs/month
Therefore I = 304,
7. 801 of all flights require an instructor,
8. Total 80/87 fuel available = 1820 gallons/month,
9. Total 115/145 fuel available = 600 gallons/month,




(a) Z = 6.65 Xi + 6.65 x 2 4 6.65 x 3 + 4.50 x h + 4.50 x 5
+ 4.94 x 6 + 3.72 x 7 + 1.47 x 8
Subj ect to
(b) Xl <. 121
(c) X 2 <: 111
(d) x 3 < 121
(e) Xi, < 121
(f) X 5 < 121
(g) XG < 121




(J) Sx 1 + 5x 2 + 5x 3 < 1820
(k) 10x 4 + 10x 5 + 10x G + llx 7 +
(1) . 8xj + .8x 2 + .8x 3 + .Sx^ +
W xn < n = 1,2, 3, ...8
+ .8x, 8x 7 + .8x 8^ 304
where x , x , x = revenue hours flown by the Cessna 150's
x, , x c = revenue hours flown by the O-lA's
x = revenue hours flown by the Cherokee 180
x
7
= revenue hours flown by the T-41
x
8
= revenue hours flown by the Commanche 2 50
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The maximum variable profit per month under the above
conditions is $2,497.93. This figure can only be achieved by
flying the three Cessna 150 's 121 hours each (the maximum
allowable) and by flying the Cherokee 180 seventeen hours,
for a total of 380 hours. None of the remaining aircraft
are operated at all. At the end of the month, there are five
gallons of 80/87 fuel and 430 gallons of 115/145 fuel remain-
ing. All of the available instructor time is exhausted.
In this example, instructor availability is the factor
which limits the total variable profit obtainable. The usual
procedure under systems analysis would be to assess the sen-
sitivity of variable profit to changes in instructor hours
available. But it is clear from the constraint equations
that if unlimited instructor hours were available, 115/145
fuel would become the limiting factor, since 588 potential
flying hours remain for the complex aircraft, but only 430
gallons of 115/145 fuel are unused. Some time can be saved
at little sacrifice if it is recalled that the club has
requested an increase in its 115/145 fuel allotment from the
Army to 2,000 gallons per month. If the maximum variable
profit is calculated for the new quantity of 115/145 fuel,
with no instructor limit, the instructor hours required can
easily be computed.
For this second problem, the objective function












and constraint (1) is removed.
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Under these new conditions, the maximum variable
profit is $3,367.15. All the Cessna 150's and the Cherokee
180 are flown up to the maximum weather limit of 121 hours.
Seventy-nine hours are flown by the 0-lA's in total. Again,
there are five gallons of 80/87 fuel remaining, but the 2,000
gallons of 115/145 are exhausted. Total instructor hours
required during the month are 563 hours x .80, or 450.4.
Before applying the variable profit model to current
club activity levels, several observations are necessary.
One conclusion that might be drawn from the analysis
so far is that the club should dispose of one 0-1A, the T-41,
and the Commanche 250, since these aircraft are not flown at
all under the conditions examined.
The reason that these aircraft are not flown is that
the variable profit maximization model inherently gives first
priority for the scarce resources of usable flight time and
available fuel to the aircraft providing the greatest variable
profit per flight hour. Given the present revenue/cost
structure, total variable profit will always be maximized
when scarce resources are allocated first to the Cessna 150's,
then to the Cherokee 180, and so on, in order of diminishing
variable profit rates per hour.
Recalling that equation (1) states that total profit
from aircraft operations (P
A )
is determined by total variable
profits less the fixed costs of ownership and maintenance,
it is obvious that P. will be maximized when total variable
profit is maximized and total fixed costs are held to
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a minimum. Minimization of aircraft fixed costs clearly can
be achieved by disposing of aircraft which are not employed
in variable profit maximization. .
For example, the first iteration of the model produced
a maximum variable profit of $2,497.93. The total fixed costs
per month of the aircraft owned (but not necessarily used)
from Appendix A is $1,145.00. Therefore the average monthly
profit from aircraft operations is
PA = Z - F = $2,497.93 - $1,145.00 = $1,352.93
But if the unused aircraft are disposed of, the profit from
aircraft operations becomes
$2,497.93 - $1,082.50 = $1,415.43
and the monthly increase in P^ is due to the saving of fixed
costs of $29.17 and $53.33 from the unused 0-1A and T-41,
respectively. No fixed costs would be recouped from return
of the leased Commanche 250 to the lessor.
The question now arises: Are the disposal actions
suggested by the profit maximization model feasible? The
answer lies in the original formulation of the problem,
which was to determine the optimum mix of aircraft which
would satisfy the needs of the membership while speeding
financial recovery. In that light, the disposal of the
Commanche 250 is not feasible, since flight in that class
aircraft is required by several training curricula offered
by the club and demanded by the membership. The same may
be said with regard to the T-41 and the 0-1A.
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A final aspect of the variable profit maximization
model deserves attention. This aspect has to do with the
fact that the model ignores the relationship between member-
ship demand, variable profit rates, and the differing monthly
fixed costs of the various aircraft in use by the club.
The monthly flight hours required to cover the fixed
costs of any aircraft type (break-even hours) are easily
computed by dividing monthly fixed cost by the variable
profit rate. From the data in Appendix A, it can be seen
that under the current pricing scheme, Cessna 150 fixed costs
are covered when the aircraft has flown 52.8 hours. Similarly,
T-41 fixed costs are covered after nine hours of flying, and
the 0-1A requires only 6.5 hours. The Cherokee 180 and Com-
manche 250 have no fixed costs due to the nature of their
lease contracts.
If any of the club-owned aircraft are flown less than
the hours required for coverage of fixed costs, and the re-
maining aircraft fly more than break- even hours, some members
are in effect subsidizing the equipment flown by others.
This inequitable possibility is ignored by the variable profit
maximization model.
In summary, then, the variable profit maximization
model is useful only to the extent that it highlights the
steps necessary to achieve maximum income from aircraft
operations under the constraints indicated. It is clear
that these steps are not feasible, given the nature of club
activities. The relationships identified in that model will
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prove useful, however, in developing more realistically
formulated alternatives.
The discussion from this point forward requires
identification of certain assumptions.
First, it will be assumed that monthly membership
dues cover the general and administrative expenses of the
club, and the costs of ground school instruction are met by
the fees charged. Therefore, financial recovery is predicated
on the profits generated by aircraft operations. Increases in
monthly dues will not be considered as a possible contribution
toward financial recovery because such a step would violate
the policy that dues should only cover the general and admin-
istrative expenses of the club. Increases in ground school
fees beyond a break-even figure will not be considered because
even at current rates, it is difficult to achieve adequate
student participation in this necessary but unexciting part
of aviation.
Second, financial recovery will be presumed to be
complete when the club acquires liquid cash reserves of $5,000
This amount is chosen because it would allow immediate replace-
ment of a ruined engine in any club-owned or Army-provided
aircraft, should that occur prior to normal replacement.
Furthermore, this amount, coupled with insurance proceeds,
would facilitate immediate replacement of a club-owned Cessna
150 in the event of total loss from an accident.
Third, soon- to-occur changes in the nature and duties
of Fort Ord military personnel, and thus the majority of club
52

membership, will allow flight activity to be distributed
evenly throughout the week.
Fourth, the dues-paying membership is the best avail-
able predictor of demand for flight activity, at approximately
2.5 hours per month per member. This assumption is clearly
tenuous, based on previous analysis, but, again, it is the
only source available to club management.
Fifth, the optimum aircraft", inventory is that which
satisfies the demand of the membership with the highest
utilization per aircraft. This assumption follows from the
common-sense notion that it makes little sense to absorb the
fixed costs of aircraft which are not used.
Given the above assumptions, it is now possible to
specify several alternative mixes of club aircraft and the
operational consequences which result from each mix. An
analysis of the implications of the various mixes will follow
the identification of the alternatives.
Alternative 1
The club presently possesses three operable Cessna
150's, one operable 0-1A, one T-41, one Cherokee 180, and
one Commanche 250. If average weather and turnaround re-
quirements limit monthly flight hours to 121 per aircraft,
the maximum variable profit available from this mix is
$4,184.18. This level of activity will require 1,815 gallons
of 80/87 fuel and 6,655 gallons of 115/145 fuel. It will
also require 667.6 man-hours of instructor time, or roughly
23 man-hours per day. Total monthly fixed cost for this mix
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is $1,115.83, therefore aircraft rental profit is $3,068.35.
Total membership that could be supported at 2.5 hours per
month is 339.
Alternative 2
If the Alternative 1 aircraft inventory were reduced
by one Cessna 150, the potential total variable profit becomes
$3,379.53 per month. The 80/87 fuel requirement will decrease
to 1210 gallons. Total flight hours will be 726 during the
month and 581 instructor hours, or roughly twenty hours per
day, will be needed. Total fixed costs decrease to $764.72,
for a total profit from aircraft operations of $2,614.81.
Note that under maximum operating conditions, $453.54 of
profits are lost by the disposal of one Cessna 150 at a sav-
ings of $351.11 in fixed costs. The total membership that
can be supported is 290.
Alternative 3
A membership roster of 100 persons implies a total
demand of 250 flight hours per month. Historically, about
80% of club flight activity has been accomplished in Cessna
150 's. Assuming that this .8 ratio holds, and that flight
hours are distributed evenly within the Cessna 150 and com-
plex categories, the Alternative 1 inventory will result in
67 flight hours per month per Cessna 150, and 12.5 hours per
complex aircraft. Total variable profit will be $1,512.88.
Subtracting fixed costs of $1,115.83, profit from aircraft
operations becomes $397.05. Total 80/87 and 115/145 fuel
consumed will be 1,000 gallons and 562 gallons, respectively.
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Approximately seven hours per day of instructor time are
needed. All aircraft having fixed costs are operated com-
fortably above break-even.
Alternative 4
If the aircraft inventory in Alternative 3 is reduced
by one Cessna 150, but membership remains at 100 and 80% of
total flight hours continue to occur in Cessna 150's, all
fuel consumption and instructor requirement figures remain
the same as in Alternative 3. Cessna 150 utilization increases
to 100 hours per month, however, and fixed costs are reduced
to $764.72. Profit from aircraft operations becomes $748.16.
Alternative 5
If club membership increases to 150 members, the
average monthly demand for flight activity can be presumed
to be 375 hours at 2.5 hours per member. If three Cessna
150's, one 0-1A, one T-41, one Cherokee 180, and one Commanche
250 are operated, and 80% of total flying is accomplished in
the Cessna 150's, Cessna 150 utilization will be 100 hours
per month, and the complex aircraft will average 18.75 hours
each. Total monthly variable profit will be $2,269.32.
Subtracting fixed costs of $1,115,85 gives an average monthly
profit from aircraft operations of $1,153.49. A total of
1,500 gallons of 80/87 and 843 gallons of 115/145 fuel will
be consumed. Some 300 hours of instructor time, or ten hours
per day, will be required. It. is worthy of note that the
current allotment of 600 gallons of 115/145 gas is exceeded
in this scenario, but consumption is well within the 2,000




With 150 members, as in Alternative 5, demanding an
assumed 375 flight hours, it is not possible to reduce the
Cessna 150 fleet as in previous cases, because if 80% of the
flying is presumed to be done in 150 's the two remaining air-
craft would be required to fly 150 hours each, which exceeds
the available time of 121 hours per month. If the percentage
of total flight time in 150 's could be reduced from 80% to 60%,
however, monthly flight hours per 150 would decrease to a
comfortable 112.5 hours each. There is no type of training
done in 150 's which cannot be accomplished in the more complex
aircraft, and the 0-1A even rents for the same rate per hour
as the 150 's. Slight modification of the training curricula
could easily accomplish the shift in activity. If the shift
could be achieved, the complex aircraft utilization would rise
to 37.5 hours each, assuming the additional hours were equally
distributed. Total variable profit would be $2,044.88. Sub-
tracting total fixed aircraft costs of $764.72 gives an average
monthly profit from aircraft operations of $1,280.16. Total
80/87 fuel consumption would be 1,125 gallons and 115/145
consumption would be 1,687 gallons, well within the expected
allocation. Flight instructor requirements would remain the
same as in Alternative 5, about ten flight hours per day.
It is now possible to examine the implications of the
preceding alternatives.
Alternatives 1 and 2 are clearly theoretical maxima
for the two aircraft mixes. Both cases suggest membership
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totals in the vicinity of 300 members, a level which is not
likely to be achieved in the near future. Both cases also
involve the consumption of over 6,600 gallons of 115/145
fuel, or some 4,600 gallons beyond the amount expected to
become available in the foreseeable future.
Alternatives 3 and 4 compare the effect of two mixes
of aircraft at current membership and flight activity levels.
The benefits gained by reducing the Cessna 150 inventory from
three to two aircraft are considerable. Monthly profit from
aircraft operations increases 881, from $397.05 to $748.16,
through avoidance of the fixed costs of one Cessna 150, and
the utilization of the remaining 150 ' s rises sharply from 67
to 100 hours per aircraft.
Alternatives 5 and 6 compare the effect of two air-
craft mixes at a moderate increase in membership and flight
activity above current levels. Again, improved profits and
utilization result from operating two vice three Cessna 150'
s
Utilization of the complex aircraft also increases due to the
necessary shift in flight activity from 150' s to the complex
planes. Both Alternatives 5 and 6 highlight the fact that
growtli from 100 to 150 members will require an increase in
115/145 fuel allotment. They also make it clear that oper-
ations at this level will require an additional full-time
flight instructor, since approximately ten hours of dual




The financial data in Appendix D shows that as of
December 31, 1974, the club had a total of $14,083.89 in cash
and accounts receivable. Assuming all the accounts receivable
are collected, settlement of current liabilities of $11,525.07
leaves a cash balance of $2,558.82. Therefore, approximately
$2,450 must be generated from aircraft profits to achieve the
$5,000 cash balance previously defined as the financial re-
covery condition.
Additionally, the current Cessna 150 fleet must be
replaced in order to meet the demands of the club membership
for newer, better quality equipment.
Analysis of the alternatives previously presented
indicates that two Cessna 150 ' s are sufficient to meet present
and foreseeable demand for this type aircraft. Therefore, the
most appropriate course of action seems to be to sell the one
disassembled and three operable Cessna 150' s currently owned
by the club. The proceeds of this sale should be applied
toward the purchase of two newer aircraft.
Investigation of the current used aircraft market
indicates that the sale of the four 150 's owned by the club
should generate in the vicinity of $10,000 at the very least.
New Cessna 150's retail for approximately $14,000 equipped for
club operations. It is clear that the proceeds of the sale of
the old ISO's will more than supply the 10-20% downpayment
required for aircraft financing. Assuming financing is ar-
ranged so that the monthly payments approximate the $194
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depreciation charge estimated in Appendix A, financial recovery
to a cash balance of $5,000 will require slightly more than
three months of average operations at current membership levels
C. THE AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROBLEM
1 . Formulation
Fort Ord Flying Club expenditures for aircraft main-
tenance have increased significantly in recent years. The
increase is noticeable both in the growing dollar amounts ex-
pended for maintenance (see Appendix D) and in the increasing
portion of total income absorbed by maintenance activity.
Table V in the preceding section shows that outlays for air-
craft maintenance reached 65% of total income and slightly
over $17 per flight hour in the third quarter of 1974. The
$17 maintenance cost per flight hour is noteworthy because
current cost estimates (see Appendix A) indicate that the
highest hourly variable cost, including fuel and oil, for any
club-owned aircraft should be $11.78. As was previously men-
tioned, the decline in both amount and proportion of funds
applied to aircraft maintenance in the fourth quarter of 1974
was due to the financial straits of the club and the enforced
cessation of all operations (including maintenance) for half
of the month of December. The decline was certainly not due
to a reduced need for maintenance. As Table 1 shows, the club
aircraft, although airworthy, are not in excellent condition.
There is little doubt that one cause of the high
overall maintenance cost per flight hour is the age of the
Cessna 150 fleet. Just a few years of abuse at the hands of
59

student pilots will rapidly tell on any training aircraft.
Another cause is the corrosive atmosphere at Fritzsche Army
Airfield, due to the close proximity of the ocean. A third
factor is occasional ill-advised and expensive attempts to
restore old, little-used aircraft to active service. But the
most important cause is the multiplicative effect of delayed
maintenance. Postponement of necessary work, whether driven
by paucity of funds or by well-intentioned efforts to save
money, eventually exacerbates the problem, causing greater
expense in the end. This rule applies to routine preventative
maintenance as well as the repair of abnormal breakdowns. And
if repair of discrepancies which keep aircraft out of service
is postponed, the additional costs of foregone revenue must
be borne.
The importance of revenue lost when aircraft are out
of service deserves emphasis. Graph 1 shows that the cost, in
terms of contribution to fixed expenses, of an aircraft being
out of service increases rapidly as utilization increases.
This seemingly obvious relationship is often overlooked in
conjunction with misguided efforts to save money on mainten-
ance. Since the preceding section suggests adjustments to
the current fleet which will result in utilization well in
excess of 50 hours per month for certain club aircraft, the
importance of this relationship is clear.
Replacement of the current fleet of Cessna 150' s with
newer aircraft should contribute to a reduction in overall






















VARIABLE PROFIT RATE = $4 PER HOUR
5 10 15
DAYS OUT OF SERVICE
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to aircraft wash and preventive maintenance schedules, little
can be done to mitigate the effect of salt air on airframes.
But there is one aspect of the club maintenance program which
merits attention: the use of club mechanics for repairs versus
sending aircraft to commercial repair firms.
A quick perusal of Appendix B reveals interruptions of
up to several months in the revenue hours produced by many of
the club aircraft. These interruptions in use are the result
of the aircraft being in need of repair, rather than any lack
of demand during the inactive periods. In some instances, the
lengthy "down" time arose out of a lack of funds to repair the
aircraft. But in most cases, it was due to delays in obtaining
parts or insufficient maintenance labor for expeditious repair.
The problem, then, is to develop a decision rule for
determining whether the costs of any necessary maintenance
action will be minimized by employing club mechanics, or by
sending the work to a commercial firm (FBO)
.
2 . Search
Due to the high cost of most major airframe and power
plant components, the club can only afford to keep items such
as tires, brake linings, rivets, and other consumables in
inventory. High-cost repair parts are purchased on an as-
needed basis from local aircraft maintenance firms or ordered
by mail from large wholesalers. Terms of list price less 101
are normally available from local firms. If the needed part
is not stocked by the local firms, they can obtain it rapidly
from their suppliers due to efficient purchasing procedures.
6 2

The club can achieve savings of 50% or more by ordering direct
from surplus companies and major wholesalers, but such trans-
actions often involve lengthy processing and shipment delays.
The club pays its mechanics, whether full- or part-
time, at the rate of $4.13 per hour. The standard labor rate
charged at local commercial firms is $15 per hour.
Based on the above information, the following decision
rule is hypothesized:
Let
P = cost of parts at commercial FBO
c *
H = estimated man-hours to repair at FBO
c ^
R = labor rate at FBO
T = time in days to repair at FBO
P, = cost of parts (including shipping) if ordered
by club
H, = estimated man-hours to repair by club mechanics
Rr = labor rate for club mechanics
T = time in days to order and receive parts
Trr = time in days to repair at club, considering
current projects and mechanic availability
it = variable profit foregone per day =
(hours flown per month/ 30 days)
x variable profit per hour
If: P +HR + ttT < P r + H.R. + tt(T + T r )c cc c f ff v p f'
send the work to the commercial Fixed Base Operator. If the
inequality sign is reversed, then, obviously, the repair




Examination of a hypothetical problem offers the best
means of evaluating the decision rule presented in the preced-
ing section.
Assume a cracked exhaust manifold is discovered on a
Cessna 150. A commercial FBO has a new manifold in stock
which will cost $95 at 10% discount from list price. The FBO
estimates that it will take four man-hours to remove and re-
place the manifold, and the hourly rate for labor is $15. The
FBO can begin work as soon as the aircraft is brought to his
facility
.
Alternatively, the manifold could be purchased by the
club from a discount supplier for $60, including shipping.
It will take seven days to order and receive the part. The
club mechanic can remove and replace the old manifold in four
hours the evening of the day the part arrives. The labor rate
for club mechanics is $4.13 per hour, and the Cessna 150 has
been flying an average of 100 hours per month at a variable
profit of $6.65 per hour.
At first glance, it might seem that the club should
perform the work, since labor and parts charges would total
$76.52, versus $155.00 at the commercial firm.
But if the assumed figures are substituted into the








H = 4 hours H r = 4 hours
c r
R = $15/hr R. = $4.13/hrc±
T = 1 day T = 7 days
c P
Tr = 0, since the work is to be
accomplished after normal
flying hours the day the
parts arrive.
tt = i^- x $6.65 - $22.17
$95 + 4($15.00) + ($22.17)1 < $60 + 4($4.13) + ($22.17)7
$177.17 < $231.71
Savings of $54.54 will be realized by sending the work to
the FBO when the costs of the aircraft being out of service
are considered.
4 . Interpretation
The decision rule presented in this analysis is clearly
useful in analyzing maintenance alternatives. It ensures that
proper consideration is given to the costs of out-of -service
aircraft
.
A similar approach can be employed to determine pri-
orities for aircraft maintenance. If two or more aircraft are
out of service simultaneously, the aircraft having the highest
variable profit foregone per day (tt ) should be repaired first,
and remaining "down" aircraft should receive attention in
decreasing order of daily variable profit foregone.
D. THE LOCATION PROBLEM
It was noted in the introductory material concerning the
Fort Ord Flying Club that the continued suitability of Fritzche
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Army Airfield as a location for club activities was open to
question. This problem will now be addressed using the systems
analysis approach.
1. Formulation
The location problem can be stated concisely without
undue discussion. The problem is:
What is the best location for the Fort Ord Flying Club,





The club began operations at Monterey Peninsula Airport
Club activities were conducted from a commercial Fixed Base
Operator's facility located on the south side of the civilian
airfield. This location was approximately twenty minutes'
driving time from the central complex of Fort Ord, twenty-five
minutes from the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, and
about ten minutes from the Naval Postgraduate School, in the
same city.
The club moved to Frtizsche Army Airfield in 1966 to
take advantage of rent-free facilities and lower aviation fuel
costs. Fritzsche Field is adjacent to the northern boundary
of the Fort Ord Reservation, about ten minutes from the main
complex. It is approximately thirty minutes' driving time
from the Defense Language Institute, and about twenty minutes
from the Naval Postgraduate School.
There are two other airports in the vicinity of the
Monterey Peninsula which might be suitable for the flying club.
The Salinas Airport is approximately fifty minutes' driving
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time from the Monterey-Fort Ord area. Watsonville Airport is
about an hour north of Monterey-Fort Ord.
A major consideration in any change in location is the
weather characteristics of alternative airports. Watsonville
Airport has no weather observation facility, so no data is
available concerning its weather pattern. Like Fritzsche,
Watsonville is located on low terrain near the seacoast and
is subject to similar coastal stratus and fog conditions.
Salinas Airport is well inland and is not troubled by coastal
stratus to the same degree as the Watsonville, Fritzsche and
Monterey Airports. Monterey Peninsula Airport is located at
approximately the same distance from the coast of Monterey Bay
as Fritzsche. It is on somewhat higher terrain, however, and
it is sheltered by a range of hills immediately to the south,
and therefore might be expected to enjoy better weather con-
ditions than Fritzsche Field. Published weather data (Appendix
c) indicates that on an annual basis Monterey Airport exper-
iences average annual ceilings and visibility conditions better
than l,500'/3 miles 55.5% of the hours between 0900-1700.
Adjusting this figure on a straight line basis to compare it
with Fritzsche weather data at l,000'/2 miles (Appendix C)
,
it becomes 741. This compares with 631 of the same hours at
Fritzsche being better than l,000'/2 miles.
While the above figures indicate that weather condi-
tions are significantly better at Monterey than at Fritzsche,
the straight line adjustment may not be valid. For the
purposes of this analysis, however, it will be presumed that
G7

the weather is on the order of 10% better at Monterey than at
Fritzsche Army Airfield.
One of the consequences of a move from Fritzsche Field
would be the loss of the 115/145 aviation gasoline presently
obtained from the Army. Commercial 100/130 octane fuel is an
acceptable alternate (and in some cases, a more desirable one)
for club aircraft. But the wholesale price of 100/130 fuel is
$.596 per gallon, or $.229 more expensive than the Army supplied
gasoline
.
Another consequence of the move would be the loss of
rent-free facilities at Fritzsche. Discussion with management
personnel at Monterey Peninsula Airport [Ref. 9] reveals that
a monthly aircraft tiedown fee of $10 is levied for parking
small, single-engine aircraft at that airport. Space to locate
the club trailer adjacent to a parking ramp could be rented for
$200 per month, and a small portable hangar of sufficient size
to perform limited maintenance could be rented for approxi-
mately $50 per month.
The club estimates that it would cost on the order of
$2,000 to move the trailer to Monterey and to tie in to
necessary utilities at the new location.
No significant administrative costs would be avoided
by departure from the Army field. The club would still be
subject to the administrative regulations which pertain to
on-post Non-appropriated Fund activities.
Several intangible benefits would accrue from a move
away from Fritzsche Airfield. The numerous small annoyances
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involved in the Army's procedures for filing flight plans and
securing aircraft would be escaped. The hazards of operating
small, fixed-wing aircraft amid intensive military rotary wing
activity would be avoided. And a move would preclude the
perennial, short-fuzed changes in location which occur due to
assignment and transfer of military units on the airfield.
Two hypotheses concerning a move seem justified:
1. The Watsonville and Salinas airports are too distant
from the three major sources of members (Fort Ord, the
Naval Postgraduate School, and the Defense Language
Institute) to be conveniently accessible.
2. Since no significant inconvenience appears to be
involved in a move to Monterey Peninsula Airport, that
location is the only feasible alternative site.
3. The decision to move to Monterey Peninsula Airport
should depend on an analysis of the incremental funds
flows that result.
3 . Evaluation
The easiest aspect of the proposed move to Monterey
to analyze is the effect of the additional fixed costs. As-
suming the club will require tiedown space for seven aircraft,
tiedown fees will total $70 per month. Adding ground rental
for trailer parking of $200, and hangar rent of $50, to tie-
down fees, gives a total incremental fixed cost of $320.
Since club policy dictates that general and administrative
expenses should be paid out of membership dues, at a total
membership of 100 members the incremental monthly dues will
be $3.20. With 150 members, the fixed cost increment is
reduced to $2.13.
It is more difficult to assess the impact of the move
on flight activity and the profits accrued from aircraft rental.
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It may be presumed that the increases in variable cost
per hour for aircraft requiring 100/130 fuel would be offset
by commensurate increases in hourly rental rates. The T-41,
for example, would have to be rented for $17.53 per hour (an
addition of $.23 per gallon x 11 GPH = $2.53).
But disregarding for a moment the effect of rental
rate increases on demand for the complex aircraft, there is
no convenient way to evaluate the effect of improved weather
on flight activity. Using the equations developed in the
aircraft replacement analysis, and assuming the recommended
two-Cessna 150 aircraft mix, the maximum feasible average
monthly profit from aircraft operations can be shown to be
$3,144.68, given the 101 better weather at Monterey. For
comparison, the maximum feasible profit at Fritzsche with the
same inventory was $2,614.81. But, as was previously empha-
sized, these figures are theoretical maxima, and are totally
unrelated to membership demand.
The difficulty in assessing the impact on flight
activity of a move arises because there is no way to evaluate
the effect on monthly flight activity per member. There is
no guarantee that a 10% increase in suitable weather will
produce a 101 increase in flight hours per month per member.
Clearly, if the average member continues to fly the same
number of hours per month at Monterey as he did at Fritzsche,
there will be no change in flight activity, and no change in
the profit from aircraft operations, if the membership remains
constant. If the average monthly flying per member doesn't:
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change, then the only result of a move will be an increase in
the number of members which can be theoretically supported
with a given aircraft inventory.
Now we may return to a point mentioned in passing
above. It seems likely that the increase in rental rates of
the complex aircraft might reduce the demand for these planes.
However, as was pointed out earlier in this paper, the demand
for club aircraft rental does not appear to be terribly price-
sensitive, so long as the hourly rates remain below those
available elsewhere. This is particularly true for the complex
aircraft which are primarily used in the advanced training
curricula. These curricula are almost without exception only
undertaken by students who are reimbursed for 90% of their
expenses by veterans' benefits, and therefore changes in the
rental rates of complex aircraft have little financial impact
on the members who fly them.
The reason that the incremental change in flight activ-
ity, and therefore profit from aircraft operations, is important
is that the funds generated by this increment will be used to
recover the estimated $2,000 cost of moving. From a purely
financial standpoint, if no additional income can be gained
to recover this initial outlay, the move should not be made.
The move to Monterey Airport may be viewed as an
investment, and the incremental income from aircraft operations
as the cash flows from that investment. The theoretically-
correct method to evaluate an investment involves the use of
present value techniques, which are thoroughly explained in
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Reference [10] . Since the flying club is presumed to have an
indefinite life, the present value of funds flows in perpetuity
may be approximated by using discount factors for fifty years
[Ref . 10] . And since the club can currently earn about 1% on
its surplus funds in a savings account, that will be the assumed
cost of capital.
Assuming flight activity increases by five percent,
either through increased activity by the current membership
of 100 members or by gaining additional members, it follows
that the average variable profit will increase by a like amount
if the increase is spread over all aircraft. Based on the
average variable profit calculated for Alternative 3 in the
aircraft replacement analysis, the new variable profit per
month will increase by $75.64 to $1,588.52 and average monthly
profit from aircraft operations will increase by a like amount,
since the fixed costs of the aircraft do not change.
This incremental monthly cash flow of $7 5.64 amounts
to $907.68 per year. Discounted at 1% for fifty years (per-
petuity), $907.68 has a present value of $12,705.70. Clearly,
the move to Monterey is justified at a five percent increase
in activity! In fact, an increase in flight activity of only
one percent above present levels is sufficient to justify the
move. A one percent increase produces an incremental cash
flow of $15.13 per month, or $181.55 per year. Discounted
for perpetuity at 71, the present value of this amount is





The incremental monthly dollar amounts generated in
the preceding analysis were derived from an assumed average
monthly profit figure. This monthly profit may or may not be
realized, since it was based on several major assumptions about
membership flight activity and aircraft inventory. The impor-
tant point is that only a very small increase in monthly profit
(less than $20) needs to be realized to justify an outlay of
of $2,000 at a cost of capital of 1% and a perpetual investment
life
.
In summary, a move to Monterey Peninsula Airport offers
the possibility of a 10% improvement in flying weather, on an
annual basis. If an increase in net income of $15 or more can
be expected to result from such an improvement in operating
environment, the move appears to be justified on a financial
basis alone. The additional benefits at Monterey of a contin-
uously operating control tower manned by competent FAA personnel,
on-airport civilian aircraft repair facilities, and better navi-
gational aids, coupled with the avoidance of the annoyances and
possible safety hazards involved in operating from a military





The systems analysis approach to decisionmaking is a
useful technique, regardless of the magnitude of the problem
attacked. It can certainly be effectively applied to the
management decisions encountered by a Non- appropriated Fund,
whether large or small.
B. SPECIFIC
The following conclusions may be drawn from the analysis
of the Fort Ord Flying Club:
1. The four Cessna 150 aircraft presently owned by the
club should be replaced by two newer models. This course
of action will meet current and expected demand for train-
ing type aircraft while speeding the attainment of a sound
financial position.
2. The decision rule developed in this thesis for deter-
mining appropriate aircraft maintenance actions should be
adopted by the club in order to minimize the costs of
aircraft operations.
3. If it can be established that a move to the Monterey
Peninsula Airport would result in a noticeable increase





AIRCRAFT REVENUE AND COST DATA
Cost Assumptions
1. Full time between overhaul (TBO) achieved for all engines.
2. Major overhauls accomplished by a commercial firm.
3. Major overhauls include accessories and propeller.
4. Periodic (100 hr and 50 hr) inspections are performed by
club mechanics.
5. Fuel prices reflect military 115/145 @ $.367 per gallon,
and commercial 80/87 @ $.538 per gallon. Commercial 80/87
price does not include $.03 per gallon tax.
6. Oil price is for bulk oil (55 gallon drum) @ $.39 per quart
Oil in cans costs $.88 per quart.
7. Normal man-hours of labor required to perform periodic
inspections supplied by commercial firm as follows:
Aircraft type 50 hr 100 hr
Cessna 150 3 10
Cessna T-41 5 15
Cessna 0-1A 4 14
8. Aircraft tires are unserviceable after approximately 300
hours of normal operations.
9. Depreciation is calculated on a straight- line basis over
a service life of 96 months for aircraft. Cessna ISO's
retail for $14,000.
10. Annual maintenance cost for avionics runs at about 10% of
the installed value.
11. Maintenance cost for leased aircraft is billed to lessor.
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Cessna 150 N7113S, N3661J, N4380U Revenue/Cost Data
Rental rate per hour $13.50
Variable costs:
Fuel (5 GPH x $.538/gal) $2.69
Oil (.25 qt/hr x $.39) .10
Engine overhaul, 1000 hr TBO
($2,200 -r- 1,000 hrs) 2.20
Scheduled inspections:
100 hr inspection
Labor (10 x 10 hr/insp x $4.13/hr
-f- 1000)
Oil changes (10 x 7 qt x $.39/qt
-^ 1000)
50 hr inspection
Labor (10 x 3 hrs x $4.13/hr -f- 1000)
Oil changes (same as 100 hr)
Unscheduled maintenance
(brake repair, tire changes, etc.)
Tires (300 hrs/set ^ 3 sets/1000 hrs)
($30/tire x 3 tires x 3 sets 4- 1000)
Total variable cost per hour
Variable profit per hour 6.65
Fixed costs per month:
Avionics (value $800 installed)
($800 x .10 h- 12) 6.67
Depreciation










Total fixed cost per month $351.11

0-1A N5483 Revenue/Cost Data
Rental rate per hour $13.50
Variable costs:
Fuel (10 GPH x $.367) $3.67
Oil (1 qt/hr x $.59) .39
Engine overhaul - 1,800 hr TBO
($4,100 *- 1800) 2.28
Scheduled inspections:
100 hr inspection:
Labor (18 x 14 hrs x $4.13 *- 1800) .58
Oil changes (18 x 9 qt x .39 ^ 1800) .04
50 hr inspections:
Labor (18 x 4 hrs x $4.13 -f- 1800) .17
Oil changes (same as 100 hr) .04
Unscheduled maintenance 1.50
Tires (300 hrs/set = 6 sets/1800 hrs)
($100/set x 6 sets + 1800 hrs) .33
Total variable cost per hour 9.00
Variable profit per hour $4.50
Fixed costs per month:
Avionics (value $500 installed)
($500 x .10 -f- 12) 4.17
Depreciation
(on loan from U.S. Army) 0.00
Insurance
(on loan from U.S. Army) , 0.00
Aircraft wash 2 5.00
Total fixed cost per month $29.17
77

Cherokee 180 N3618R Revenue/Cost Data
Rental rate per hour
Variable costs:
Fuel (10 GPH x $.567)
Oil (1 qt/hr x $.39







Variable profit per hour $4.94
78

T-41 N17282 Revenue/Cost Data
Rental rate per hour $15.50
Variable costs :
Fuel (11 GPH x $.367/gal) $4.04
Oil (1 qt/hr x $.39/qt) .39
Engine overhaul - 1,000 hr TBO
($4600 * 1000) 4.60
Scheduled inspections:
100 hr inspections:
Labor (10 x 15 hrs/insp x $4.13/hr
-h 1000) .62
Oil changes (10 x 8 qt x $.39 - 1000) .03
50 hr inspections:
Labor (10 x 5 hrs/insp x $4.13 -h 1000) .21
Oil changes (same as 100 hr) .05
Unscheduled maintenance:
(brake repair, tire changes, etc.) 1.50
Tires (300 hrs/set ^ 3 sets/1000 hrs)
($40/tire x 3 tires x 3 sets -f- 1000) .36
Total variable cost per hour 11.78
Variable profit per hour 3.72
Fixed costs per month:
Avionics (value $1,000 installed)
($1,000 x 10t 12) 8.33
Depreciation
(on loan from U.S. Army) 0.00
Insurance
(on loan from U.S. Army) 0.00
Aircraft wash 25.00
Total fixed cost per month $33.33
79

Commanche 2 50 N623 2P Revenue/Cost Data
Rental rate per hour
Variable costs:
Fuel (14 GPH x $.367)
Oil (1 qt/hr x .39)
Lease cost per hour
Total variable cost
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Ceiling less than 3,000' and/or visibility less than 3 miles






Ceiling less than 1,000' and/or visibility less than 2 miles






Ceiling less than 1,500' and/or visibility less than 3 miles
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Sources and Uses of Funds
January 1, 1973 - December 31, 1973
Uses
Increase in Planes and Equipment $2,647.57
Increase in Prepaid Insurance 137.00
Decrease in Notes Payable (current) 995.85
Decrease in Accounts Payable 156,65
Decrease in Notes Payable (deferred) 3,860.71
Decrease in Membership Deposits 390.00
Decrease in Reserve for Major Overhaul 2, 733.70
Total uses $10,921.48
Sources
Funds Provided by Operations
Net Income (Loss) $(960.52)
Depreciation charged
without outlay 5,491.6 $4,531.08
Decrease in Cash on Hand
Checking 3,726.00
Savings (Increase) (55. 84) 3,670.16







Sources and Uses of Funds
First Quarter 1973
Uses
Increase in cash on hand
Checking $4,642.28
Savings 12.80 $4,655.08
Increase in Planes and Equipment 415.96
Decrease in Accounts Payable 156.65
Decrease in Notes Payable (deferred) 1,297.47
Total uses $6,525.16
Sources
Funds provided by Operations
Net Income $1,981.34
Depreciation charged
without outlay 1,368.90 3,350.24
Decrease in Accounts Receivable 596.02
Decrease in Prepaid Insurance 792.99
Increase in Membership Deposits 300.00






Sources and Uses of Funds
Second Quarter 1973
Uses
Increase in Planes and Equipment $1,205.03
Increase in Prepaid Insurance 1,489.59
Decrease in Notes Payable (deferred) 1,297.47
Decrease in reserve for major overhaul 741 . 66
Total uses $4,733.75
Sources
Funds provided by Operations
Net Income (Loss) $(450.37)
Depreciation charged
without outlay 1,372.90 922.55
Decrease in cash on hand
Checking 2,535.70
Savings (increase) (1 3 .48 ) 2,522.22





Sources and Uses of Funds
Third Quarter 1973
Uses
Increase in Planes and Equipment $1,183.88
Increase in Prepaid Insurance 280.64
Decrease in Notes Payable (current) 31.70
Decrease in Notes Payable (deferred) 1,265.77
Decrease in Membership Deposits 450.00
Decrease in reserve for major overhaul 2 , 247 . 44
Total uses $5,459.43
Sources
Funds provided by Operations
Net Income (Loss) $(1,953.07)
Depreciation charged
without outlay 1,374.90 $(578.17)
Decrease in cash on hand
Checking 4,787.19
Savings (increase) (14.70 ) 4,772.49





Sources and Uses of Funds
Fourth Quarter 1975
Uses
Increase in Accounts Receivable $429.89
Decrease in Notes Payable (current) 964.15
Decrease in Membership Deposits 240.00
Decrease in reserve for major overhaul 1 , 230 . 51
Total uses $2,864. 55
Sources
Funds provided by Operations
Net Income (Loss) $(538.42)
Depreciation charged
without outlay 1,374.90 $856.48
Decrease in cash on hand
Checking 1,045.39
Savings (increase) (14 . 86 ) 1,030.55
Decrease in Planes and Equipment 157.50



















































FORT ORD FLYING CLUB
ASSETS, MARCH 197 3
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash in Bank: Checking $8,457.61
Savings 1,293. 52





Total Accounts Receivable 7 , 836. 16
Total Current Assets $17,587.29
FIXED ASSETS
Planes and Equipment















Membership Deposit (140) 4,200.00
Major Overhaul (estimate) 5 ,464 .43
Total Deferred Liabilities 12,227.67
NET WORTH
Net Worth, Feb. 28, 1973





TOTAL LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH $47,714.56
93


















































FORT ORD FLYING CLUB
ASSETS, JUNE 1973
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash in Bank: Checking $5,921.91
Savings 1,307.00





Total Accounts Receivable 6, 547 . 16
Total Current Assets $13,776.07
FIXED ASSETS
Planes $ Equipment 48,515.70
Less: Depreciation 19,035.63
Total Fixed Assets 29,480.07
PREPAID ACCOUNTS










Membership Deposits (140) 4,200.00
Major Overhaul 4 , 722 . 77
Total Deferred Liabilities 10,188.54
NET WORTH






TOTAL LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH 45,225.06
96






Dues and Initiation 1,145.00
Ground School 162.00








Facility and Utilities 88.49







Miscellaneous 7 . 00
Total Expenses 4,695.98
LOSS FOR SEPTEMBER 1973 686.73
97

FORT ORD FLYING CLUB
ASSETS, SEPTEMBER 1973
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash in bank Checking $1,134.72
Savings 1,321.70






Total Accounts Receivable 5,282.05
Total Current Assets $7,738.47
FIXED ASSETS
Planes and Equipment
























Net Worth, 31 Aug 1973





TOTAL LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH $39,277.08
99














































LOSS FOR DECEMBER $151.73
100

FORT ORD FLYING CLUB
ASSETS, DECEMBER 1973
CURRENT ASSETS
Cash in bank: Checking 89.33
Savings 1 , 33 6. 56








Total Accounts Receivable 5,711 . 94
Total Current Assets $7,137.83
FIXED ASSETS
Planes and Equipment















Membership Deposits (117) $3,510.00
Major Overhaul 1,244.82
Total Deferred Liabilities 4,7 54.8 2
NET WORTH
Net Worth, 30 Nov 1973
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Sources and Uses of Funds
January 1, 1974 - December 31, 1974
Increase in cash on hand:
Checking $2,234.57
Savings 76.86 $2,311.4 3
Increase in Accounts Receivable 4,334.63
Increase in Miscellaneous Receivables 300.00
Increase in gas and oil inventories 203.55
Increase in resale inventories 216.59
Increase in barrel deposit 15.00
Decrease in Notes Payable 1,934.61
Decrease in Membership Deposits 150.00
Decrease in Reserve for Major Overhaul 217.52
Total uses $9,683.33
Sources
Decrease in Planes § Equipment $1,209.98
Decrease in Prepaid Insurance 288.07
Increase in Accounts Payable 8,347.65
Increase in Unearned Dues 918.00
Funds provided by Operations:
Net Income (Loss) $(4,464.05)
Depreciation charged




Profit on sale of glider 468.00
Quarter III (1.00)
Quarter IV





Sources and Uses of Funds
First Quarter 1974
Uses
Increase in Cash on Hand:
Checking $1,527.80
Savings 0.00 $1,527.80
Increase in Accounts Receivable 4,393.15
Increase in Gas Inventory 362.50
Increase in Planes and Equipment 452.52
Decrease in Reserve for Major Overhaul 1 , 240 . 02
Total uses $7,975.99
Sources
Decrease in Prepaid Insurance $922.75
Increase in Notes Payable (current) 2,756.99
Increase in Accounts Payable 1,788.92
Increase in Unearned Dues 934.00
Increase in Membership Deposits 480.00
Funds Provided by Operations:
Net Income (Loss) $ (281.57)
Depreciation charged





Sources and Uses of Funds
Second Quarter 1974
Uses
Increase in Accounts Receivable $2,250.32
Increase in Gas Inventory 35.00
Increase in Prepaid Insurance 1,446.69
Decrease in Notes Payable 716.64
Decrease in Reserve for Major Overhaul 4 . 80
Total uses $4,453.45
Sources
Decrease in Cash on Hand:
Checking $425.43
Savings (increase) (45.3 5) $380.08
Decrease in Planes and Equipment 2,000.00
Increase in Accounts Payable 5,370.28
Increase in Unearned Dues 104.00
Increase in Membership Deposits 180.00
Funds Provided by Operations:
Net Income (Loss) (2,538.84)
Depreciation charged
without Outlay 839.90*
Profit on Sale of Glider 468.00
Adjustment** ( 2,349.97 ) ( 3,580.91 )
Total sources $4,453.45
* Difference ($568.00) between amount shown and depreciation
expense listed on Profit § Loss due to adjustment from sale
of glider.




Sources and Uses of Funds
Third Quarter 1974
Uses
Increase in Resale Inventory-
Decrease in Notes Payable (current)
Decrease in Unearned Dues








Decrease in Cash on Hand:
Checking
Savings
Decrease in Accounts Receivable
Decrease in Gas Inventory
Decrease in Prepaid Insurance
Increase in Accounts Payable





















Sources and Uses of Funds
Fourth Quarter 1974
Uses
Increase in Cash on Hand:
Checking $1,364.40
Savings 31.51 $1,395.91
Increase in Resale Inventory 57.44
Increase in Barrel Deposit 15.00
Increase in Planes and Equipment 337.50
Decrease in Notes Payable 2,437.48
Decrease in Accounts Payable 1,310.72
Decrease in Membership Deposits 270.00
Total uses $5,824.05
Sources
Decrease in Accounts Receivable $ 890.19
Decrease in Gas Inventory 156.95
Decrease in Prepaid Insurance 672.75
Increase in Unearned Dues 114,00
Increase in Reserve for Major Overhaul 1,027.30
Funds Provided by Operations:
Net Income $ 704.96
Depreciation charged
without Outlay 1,407.90


























Depreciation 4 58. 30
Total Expenses $6,399.97
LOSS FOR MARCH 1974 $32.57
109





Cash in Bank $1,617.14 (Checking)
1 ,336. 56 (Savings)



































Unearned Dues 934. 00
Total Current Liabilities SS,673.94
DEFERRED LIABILITIES
Membership Deposits (135) 3,990.00
Major Overhaul 4 . 80
Total Deferred Liabilities 3,994.80
NET WORTH
Net Worth (adj.) 28 Feb 1974 27,106.15
Less Profit for March 1974 52.5"
Total Net Worth 2 7,073.58
TOTAL NET WORTH AND LIABILITIES $40,742.32
111






Dues and Initiation 1 , 190 . 00
Ground School 180. 00
Interest on Savings 45.35









PP Ground School 130.00






Miscellaneous 184 . 71
Total Expenses $6,497.90
LOSS FOR JUNE 1974 $570.26
112





Cash in Bank $1,191.71 (Checking)
1,381.91 (Savings)




































Unearned Dues for July 1,038.00
Total Current Liabilities $14,431.58
DEFERRED LIABILITIES
Membership Deposits (139) 4,170.00
Major Overhaul . 00
Total Deferred Liabilities 4,170.00
NET WORTH
Net Worth, 31 May 1974 25,573.00
Less: Loss for June 1974 570.26
Adjustment 2,349. 97
Total Net Worth 22,652.77
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH $41,254.35
114

FORT ORD FLYING CLUB
June 1974





Major Overhaul 686. 69
Total adjustment to net worth$ 2 , 349 . 97
115






Dues and Initiation 1,094.00
Tax Refund 4 7.96









Interest on Notes 48.78







LOSS FOR SEPTEMBER 1974 $524.88
116





Cash in Bank Checking $ 959.50
Savings 1,381.91






Total Accounts Receivable 11,236.76
Gas Inventory 360 .
5















FORT ORD FLYING CLUB
September 1974











Membership Deposits (121) 3,630.00
NET WORTH
Net Worth 31 August 1974
Less: Loss for Sep 1974
Total Net Worth














Dues and Initiation 940.00






































































FORT ORD FLYING CLUB
December 1974




Unearned Dues for Jan 1975 913.00
Total Current Liabilities $11,525.07
DEFERRED LIABILITIES
Membership Deposits (112) 3,360.00
Major Overhaul 1,027.30
Total Deferred Liabilities 4,387.30
NET WORTH
Net Worth, 31 Nov 1974 20,329.63
Plus: Parts credit from
Monarch Aviation 850.00
Plus: Profit for Dec 1974 64.55
Total Net Worth 21,244.18




FORT ORD FLYING CLUB
ACTIVELY FLYING AND VA MEMBERSHIP
February 1973 - November 1974
Actively Flying VA
Year Month Members Members
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